Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 86
Issue 1 Fall

Article 14

Fall 1995

Book Reviews

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Book Reviews, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 231 (1995-1996)

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091.4169/95/8601-0231
THJouPNAL OF CimiNmAL LAW & CRImINOLOGY

Copyright @ 1995 by Northwestem University, School of Law

Vol. 86, No. 1

Pinted in USA.

BOOK REVIEWS

Constitutional Firepower: New Light on the
Meaning of the Second Amendment
JEREMY RABKIN*
To KEEP AND BEAR ARMs,THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT.
By Joyce L. Malcolm. Harvard University Press 1994. Pp. 246.
A well regulatedMilitia, being ncessay to the security of afree State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.
U.S. CONST. amend. II
That the Subjects which are Protestantsmay have Armes for their defence Suitable

to their Condition and as allowed by Law.
- Section 7, English Bill of Rights, 1689 (1 W.&M., 2d Sess., c.2)
Joyce Malcolm's careful historical study attempts to shed light on
the original understanding of the Second Amendment by presenting
the full background of its forerunner, the arms provision in the English Bill of Rights.1 It is a very timely undertaking. The Second
Amendment itself has only in very recent years begun to receive serious scholarly attention. The implications of the English background
to the Second Amendment have hardly been studied.
Legal scholarship on the Bill of Rights has, in general, had little
to say about the Second Amendment. Some scholars have asserted
that it is simply "anachronistic," 2 akin to the Third Amendment guarantee against the quartering of troops in private homes.
On this view, the amendment reflects the preoccupations of colonial Americans, particularly their fear of a "standing army"-associated with a distant, unaccountable and oppressive royal authority.
The text of the Second Amendment seems to reinforce this notion by
linking the "right to keep and bear arms" with the necessity of "a well* Associate Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University.
1 JoYcE LEE MALcoLM,To KEYP AND BFAR ARMs, THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
RIGHT (1994).
2 John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 1948
CHI.-KENT L REV. 148, 166. See also Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens:
An HistoricalAnalysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1975).
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regulated militia."3 At the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, antifederalists may have thought it necessary to guarantee such separate military capabilities within the states as a check on potential abuses by the
new federal government (and its constitutional power to maintain a
national standing army). But that was long ago.
According to the current prevailing view, this guarantee to the
states is, technically, still satisfied by the maintenance of the National
Guard, whose units are organized state by state. The Supreme Court
noted as much in its most recent major decision on the Second
Amendment. 4 This decision, however, was shortly before World War
II-the last period when the United States was still content with a
merely skeletal national military force. In the decades since then,
America has become accustomed to the maintenance of a vast national defense establishment. Colonial cautions about "standing armies" have come to seem as quaint as the muskets of the Minutemen
at Lexington.
The Second Amendment, by this reasoning, has no relevance to
contemporary debates about gun control because it was never about
the rights of individual citizens. 5 At best, it is a monument to eighteenth century ideals about citizen soldiering which are sadly but definitively obsolete in a world of cruise missiles and jet fighters. At
worst, it is a relic of an era where "states' rights" was literally a fighting
cause-an era definitively and happily brought to a close by the surrender at Appomattox. To consider a different view of the Second
Amendment would simply be, as the title of a famous article in the
6
Yale Law Journalput it, "embarrassing."
But even the most cursory investigation of the prevailing interpretation, if pursued with any honesty, unavoidably runs into "embarrassing" facts, as some insistent dissidents from the prevailing "collective
right" view have begun to point out. For example, the actual text of
the amendment is hard to reconcile with the notion that it has no
relevance to individual rights-unless one is prepared to say the same
thing about the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
in the Fourth Amendment, which is also prefaced with an appeal to
"the right of the people."7 Perhaps more importantly, it is clear that
3 U.S. CONST.

amend. I.

4 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

5 See, e.g., Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Orins and Meaning of the
Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. Am.HIST. 22, 42 (1984); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS,
THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL 139-47 (1987).
6 Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendmen 99 YALE LJ. 637 (1989).
7 The "collective right" interpretation is defended, for example, by Cress, supra note 5,
at 42, and ably challenged, on textual grounds, by Levinson, supra note 6, at 645. See also
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) ("'[T]he people' seems to
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the Second Amendment was not simply a byproduct of debates over
the new Federal Constitution. The language of the amendment echoes provisions in state constitutions from the 1770s. And both the
language and the context of the Second Amendment bear obvious
analogies to the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the evident source for
several other provisions in the Federal Constitution.8 Yet "states'
lights" was of no relevance to the Parliament that reasserted the "ancient and indubitable rights" of Englishmen (as the concluding, summary section of the English Bill of Rights describes them). The
English Bill of Rights does not even make reference to county militia.
Some scholars have nonetheless dismissed the relevance of the
parallel guarantee in the English Bill of Rights by invoking the same
considerations deployed against the Second Amendment. The English guarantee, it is said, was also inspired by fear of standing armies
and the power they might afford to oppressive kings. It is also said
that the English guarantee was inspired by a concern to maintain an
ultimate checking power, diffused among the people in their local militias. Hence the English guarantee is equally irrelevant to modem
concerns. 9
It did not require any great ingenuity or impressive research to
launch this argument against the modem relevance of remote English
precedent (which may be one reason why modem polemicists have
not bothered to deploy either much ingenuity or much research on
this point). It did not even require any particular animus against firearms or handguns, nor any partisan zeal, to withdraw the Second
Amendment from the eager clutches of contemporary gun
enthusiasts.
The argument was already stated in confident terms by that most
self-confident of early Victorians, the historian Thomas Macaulay. An
have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution ....
[This textual
exegesis] suggests that 'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First

and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connections with this country to be considered
part of that community."); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EvERYMAN BEARmED 76-80 (1984)
(discussing various historical sources which show that the Bill of Rights was intended to
protect the rights of individual citizens).
8 For example, § 9 of the English Bill of Rights asserts that "the freedom of speech and
debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any
court or place out of Parliament." Article I, § 6 of the U.S. Constitution gives a close paraphrase of this language. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is an even closer paraphrase of § 10 of the English Bill of Rights: "That excessive
bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9 Weatherup, supra note 2, at 974.
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armed citizenry had been of great historic importance, he explained
in the opening chapter of his History of England, in constraining the
power of medieval kings and securing the historic liberties of Englishmen. But this historic truth could hardly have much relevance amidst
the modem conditions of the nineteenth century:
The people have long unlearned the use of arms. The art of war has
been carried to a perfection unknown to former ages; and the knowledge of that art is confined to a particular class.... In the meantime, the
effect of the constant progress of wealth has been to make insurrection
far more terrible to thinking men than mal-administrafion.... It is no
exaggeration to say that a civil war of a week on English ground would
now produce disasters which would be felt from the Hoangho to the
Missouri and of which the traces would be discernible at the distance of
a century. In such a state of society resistance must be regarded as a
cure more desperate than almost any malady which can afflict the
state.... As we cannot, without the risk of evils from which the imagination recoils, employ physical force as a check on misgovernment, it is
evidently our wisdom to keep all the constitutional checks on misgovernment in the highest state of efficiency....10

The complacent mid-Victorian "imagination" might "recoil"
before the thought of actual warfare in a modem, industrializing
economy-the passage having been written before the American Civil
War. Would Macaulay have been more shocked by the systematic
horrors of twentieth century warfare, or by the completeness with
which devastated nations recovered from them in less than one generation? Perhaps he would have been most of all shocked by the surge
of crime and violence in nations which, by Victorian standards, are
almost unimaginably wealthy and technologically advanced. No matter. In relatively recent times, the same Victorian outlook could be
voiced with almost the same tone of confidence in an article dismissing the contemporary significance of the Second Amendment:
As the policing of society becomes more efficient, the need for armed
self-defense becomes more irrelevant; and as the society itself becomes
more complex, the military power in the hands of the government becomes more powerful and the government itself more responsive, the
11
right to bear arms becomes more futile, meaningless and dangerous.
Sometimes it requires a good historian to break the delusion that
history--or the mere passage of time-is an invincible, protective
moat, shielding later eras from the preoccupations of the past. At any
rate, Joyce Malcolm's new study of the English antecedents of the Second Amendment turns out to be a far more timely and intriguing
work than one would have expected, given the conventional treat10 THOMAS BABINGTON MAcAULAY, THE HIsToRY OF ENGLAND
11 Levin, supra note 2, at 167.

27-28 (1848).
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ments of this subject.
Malcolm is a professional historian, and this is a careful history, as
much a work of social and political as of legal history. Though she is
plainly aware that her subject has some bearing on an emerging debate concerning the Second Amendment, she does not overemphasize the implications of her findings for constitutional constructions in
contemporary America. The work is not, in other words, an exercise
in topping arguments about "original intent" with learned demonstrations of "primordial intent," But the book does succeed in clarifying
some important misunderstandings about the English roots of the
Second Amendment. In the process of doing so, it offers some sobering reminders that the modem world is not so removed from the preoccupations of the past as we may like to think.
In Professor Malcolm's telling, the arms guarantee in the English
Bill of Rights reflects a long history. The book actually begins with
medieval practices and does not reach the debates of 1689 until twothirds of the way to its conclusion. This history demonstrates that the
Parliament of 1689 was shading the truth a good deal when it included the right to hold arms among the "true, ancient and indubitable rights" of Englishmen. This right was not mentioned in the
Magna Carta. It was not mentioned in the Petition of Right of 1628,
with which Parliament set out the claims that later touched off the
English Civil War. It was not recognized by any explicit judicial ruling
before 1689. And the Parliament that voted the Bill of Rights in 1689
had every reason to know all this. At the very least, this history proves
that the arms provision in the English Bill of Rights was not put there
because of antiquarian piety.
The Parliament of 1689 set out, quite deliberately, to establish a
new legal tradition. In January 1689, a hastily assembled "Convention" (not considered a true Parliament, because not summoned by
the king under the traditional forms) agreed on a list of grievances
and a statement of rights, which came to be known as the Declaration
of Rights. William and Mary accepted the Declaration of Rights,
along with the crown of England, at a formal ceremony in mid-February. Thereafter, the "Convention" was reorganized as an official Parliament and before the end of the year, reenacted the rights
provisions of the Declaration as a binding statute, which came to be
known as the Bill of Rights. Yet Parliament's motives for including the
arms guarantee in the Declaration and the Bill of Rights are not easily
discerned from the fragments of debate that have survived from that
period.
Professor Malcolm gives due recognition to the assumption that
Parliament was most of all concerned about preventing the king's

236
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army from securing a monopoly of force. More than any other factor,
the revolution against KingJames II reflected the widespread fear that
he was building up a force of Catholic professional soldiers to reduce
the Protestant, constitutional government of England to a French-style
absolute monarchy. Whig parliamentarians were keen to establish the
notion that standing armies were dangerous and the people needed
to have their own arms as a standing check on princely usurpation.
Thus, the Declaration of Rights contains a protest against maintaining
standing armies in peacetime without parliamentary consent, along
with the guarantee of the subject's right to bear arms. In an earlier
draft, the "arms" provision seemed to allude to the militia, declaring
that subjects "should provide and keep Arms for their common
Defence."12
There is certainly a sound basis for the assumption that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 inspired concerns quite parallel to those attributed to the champions of the Second Amendment, a century later,
in the wake of another revolution against royal power. If the actual
wording of the English provision is less clear on this point, that may
reflect a parliamentary concern to avoid giving needless offense to
William of Orange. The Declaration of Rights was drawn up only
weeks after William had arrived in England with a body of Dutch
troops-saving the country from the tyrannical ambitions of James II.
Parliament by then was anxious to have William mount the English
throne to safeguard the revolution. But he could not be expected to
accept a crown offered to him along with an explicit threat of popular
insurrection. 13 Besides, Tory members of Parliament, nearly equal in
strength to the Whigs, were anxious to downplay suggestions of an
ongoing right of revolution, which was so hard to reconcile with the
doctrines of the Anglican Church.
But the fact is that the Tories did consent to language endorsing
a right to hold arms. Moreover, the Whigs in later years readily consented to a standing force of Dutch guards for the new king and voted
to direct resources to the maintenance of a sizable, professional military force for William's campaigns in Europe. So the arms guarantee,
if not an unreflective bow to tradition, was not simply an expression of
protest against standing armies.
Nor was the arms guarantee simply a sentimental cheer for the
county militias. The militia system was not simply an alternative to a
standing army. It was also, from its medieval origins, an alternative to
a centralized police system. And it continued to play this role
MALcoLM, .supranote 1, at 117.
13 Id. at 120-21.
12
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throughout the seventeenth century. Under Cromwell's "commonwealth," militia officers were instructed to "exercise espionage on
strangers" in order to detect subversive activities and to keep close
watch on government supplies in order "to prevent embezzlement or
misconversion" of these "inventories." 14 After the Restoration of the
monarchy, the militia was deployed on behalf of Charles II to detain
"divers persons suspected to be fanaticks, sectaries or disturbers of the
peace" 15 and the Convention Parliament actually protested abuses of
individual rights by the militia. The militia itself was therefore not
simply the darling force of parliamentarians fearful of an oppressive
central power.
Yet apart from these more specialized or "political" tasks of the
militia, local citizens were obliged, from medieval times, to take turns
standing night "watch" at town gates and supplying the "ward" at these
gates during the day. These duties were imposed on "men able of
body and sufficiently weaponed." Households unable to supply such
men (those headed by widows or disabled men) were obliged to hire a
substitute or suffer criminal penalties. 1 6 Such policing duties occasioned grumbling and resistance, but they were still enforced in the
latter part of the seventeenth century; they were still enforced because
they were still very much needed. But they remained quite
inadequate.
Crime remained an acute and pervasive problem for seventeenth
century Englishmen. "The extensive operations of highwaymen made
arms mandatory for a traveler."' 7 Robbery was so common in some
parts of the countryside that a popular proverb claimed, "[H]ere if
you beat a bush, its odds you'd start a Thief."18 Even in the environs
of London, Samuel Pepys, a royal official, was delighted to be assigned
"three or four armed" bodyguards for an evening stroll as "this walk is
dangerous to walk alone at night and much robbery [is] committed
here." 19 Wealthy travelers generally followed the example of hiring
armed guards to accompany them. And it was "not uncommon" in
private homes "to place a blunderbuss in a window to warn thieves to
20
keep away."
Guns, in short, were relied upon for defense against crime and
not just for military functions. And by the seventeenth century, the
14 Id. at
15 Id. at

26.
36.

16

Id. at 8.

17

Id. at 84.
Id. at 82.

18

19 Id. at 85.
20 Id.
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cost of guns had come down to the point where "firearms were available to a large portion of the population."2' Professor Malcolm calculates that a new musket might be purchased in the late seventeenth
century for the equivalent of three weeks pay for an agricultural laborer in harvest time.2 2 But older guns might sell for dramatically less
and many people had access to stolen guns and to weapons acquired
from the army during the Civil War.23 Besides, "[1]ocal blacksmiths
were able to manufacture gun and rifle barrels and stocks with their
24
ordinary equipment and fit them with locks from gunshops."
Professor Malcolm's history suggests, however, that even beyond
their significance as instruments of self-defense, access to firearms had
come to be seen, by the late seventeenth century, as a badge of civic
equality. This story has much to do with the history of hunting and
the class legislation deployed to preserve the special privileges of the
great land owners. Professor Malcolm rightly devotes a good deal of
attention to it.
From medieval times, both monarchs and great lords had tried to
restrict hunting in their forests. Limiting access to hunting devices
and impounding weapons used by poachers were standard techniques
in this effort to exclude common people from "the gentleman's
game." These measures caused much resentment and, perhaps for
this reason, were not often enforced with full rigor. In 1671, only a
decade after the restoration of Charles II, Parliament enacted a particularly stringent Game Act, which, in contrast to previous measures, set
a very high threshold of land ownership to qualify for hunting privileges: "Wealthy merchants, prosperous lawyers, and others who had a
goodly amount of personal wealth but insufficient income from land
were instantly deprived of their right to hunt and grouped together
25
with those defined in the law as 'idle and disorderly."'
Professor Malcolm speculates that the motives for this enactment
included a concern to disarm potential political enemies in the wake
of the Restoration.2 6 But she also provides evidence that the Game
Act (along with earlier such measures) was not enforced, except
against those actually caught poaching. She concludes that "if the ordinary person were moderately discreet, he could keep a handgun or
use shot with little fear of arrest or confiscation of his weapon." 27 But
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id.
25 Id. at 71.
21
22
23
24

26 Id. at

75.

27 Id. at 81.
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the legal threat to confiscate the hunting weapons of the non-landed
still seems to have stung.
Even more resented were the measures that allowed the disarming of critics of royal power. Most notable among these measures was
the Militia Act of 1662, which permitted militia officers to disarm subjects at their discretion. At the Convention Parliament of 1689, this
measure-and its application by James II-was protested with special
bitterness: "Forcible disarmament was personally humiliating-some
members [of Parliament] had been disarmed" and voiced their indignation directly to their colleagues.2 8 Among the specific "complaints"
against the reign ofJames II in the Declaration of Rights was a protest
against the King's actions "causing several good Subjects, being Protestants, to be disarmed." 29 Laws had long since provided for the disarming of Catholics as suspected enemies of the Protestant state. But
by 1689, it had come to seem something of an outrage that Protestants
themselves, if not guilty of some definite crime, should also be
disarmed.
Still, the provision as finally adopted in the English Bill of Rights
asserted the right of Protestant subjects to "have Armes" and then proceeded to qualify this guarantee with the stipulation that such arms be
"suitable to their Condition and as allowed by Law." What was meant
by this limiting stipulation? Clearly, the stipulation reserved some role
for game laws to limit access to hunting weapons. Did it mean anything beyond this? In acknowledging a previous history of restriction
and regulation, it may have reflected no more than an anxiety to
make the newly asserted right "to have Armes" seem more plausible as
an "ancient right." Or it may have reflected an accommodation to the
cautions of members of the House of Lords who were not so keen at
the time on a general right to be armed. The limiting words "suitable
to their Condition and as allowed by Law" are known to have been
inserted at the prompting of the House of Lords.3 0 The final language may reflect both haste and the pressure for speedy compromise, as well: "The entire Declaration was very much a compromise
measure composed of general statements that the majority of English"3
men could support. '
But if subsequent actions can shed light on the understanding of
1689, it would seem that the right asserted at that time was, in fact,
very broadly conceived. Within a month after enacting the Declaration of Rights, the Parliament turned its attention to disarming
28

Id. at 116.

29 Id. at 119.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 120.
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Catholics, who were perceived as likely to side with plotters for the
return of the deposed King James II. No mention was made in this
context of seeking to disarm citizens of any other "condition" nor
those whose possession of guns was not otherwise "allowed by law."
On the contrary, members of Parliament openly acknowledged that
even Catholics would probably have to be allowed to retain guns for
personal self-defense.3 2 As finally enacted, the measure prohibited
any Catholic from retaining arms, gunpowder, or ammunition beyond
what might be "allowed... for the Defence of his House or Person."3 3
Only three years later, a new Game Act did not even mention guns in
its list of prohibited hunting devices.- 4
By the early eighteenth century, English courts were explicitly rejecting the notion that mere ownership of guns could be prohibited
by game laws.3 5

By 1780, the right to have arms was so deeply en-

trenched that there was much indignation when the army sought to
disarm an urban mob. Professor Malcolm gives due attention to this
remarkable episode, which followed several days of fierce rioting in
London, in which some 450 persons died. The senior commander of
the British army ordered efforts to disarm the general population of
the city, since it was "both improper and unsafe to trust arms in...
the hands of a rabble or a mob." In the House of Lords, the commander's words and actions were denounced as "a direct violation" of
"the sacred and inviolable statute" guaranteeing "that every Protestant
subject shall be permitted to arm himself for his personal security, or
for the defence of his property."3 6 A resolution of censure was ultimately defeated, but only after supporters of the government undertook to demonstrate that the general had only intended the disarming
37
of London to be a temporary, emergency measure.
By taking her account of English practice down to the end of the
eighteenth century and then offering a brief sketch of changing patterns in this century, Professor Malcolm lends weight to her claim that
the American Second Amendment was influenced by very similar considerations as its English forebear. The American Founders might
have been aware of provisions in the English Bill of Rights without
grasping the full import of these provisions a century earlier. So, for
example, the drafters of the American Bill of Rights do seem to have
copied the prohibition in the English Bill of Rights regarding "cruel
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

122.
123.
126.
129.
130-31.
132.
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and unusual punishments" without any clear sense of what this had
meant in seventeenth century England or what purpose it might serve
in their own circumstances.3 8 But in a separate chapter on the American arms amendment, Professor Malcolm offers a good deal of evidence to suggest that, at least in relation to citizen access to firearms,
the American founders were operating in what was still a living legal
tradition.
Certainly, the fear of standing armies and an attachment to local,
citizen militias were important elements in the foreground of this tradition. A number of early state constitutions thus contained explicit
provisions regarding the maintenance of a citizen militia, together
with warnings against or restrictions upon standing military forces.3 9
But some states also acknowledged a separate, individual right to be
armed. For example, the "Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants
of Pennsylvania," adopted in 1776, specified that "the people have a
right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state." 40 Professor Malcolm argues that more oblique references-such as the preamble to the Delaware Constitution of 1776, including among the
"natural, inherent, and unalienable rights" of men, the rights of "defending life and liberty.., and protecting property"-constitute an
implicit endorsement of an individual right to bear arms for personal
self-defense. 4 1 Similarly, in the state ratification debates over the new
federal constitution, several states urged the necessity of amendments
for the federal charter and a number of these endorsed an individual
right to own guns. New Hampshire, for example, urged the need for
an amendment to specify that "Congress shall never disarm any citizen
42
unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion."
There was a keen sense of individual gun ownership as a necessary measure of defense against violence and disorder. Professor Malcolm finds that from the earliest decades of English colonial
settlement in America, local authorities not only sought to organize
militia units but in many instances issued directives requiring all
householders to arm themselves against possible dangers. 4 3 As late as
38 At the time the Eighth Amendment was debated in Congress, one member noted of

the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause that "the clause seems to express a great deal
of humanity... but as it seems to have no meaning to it,
I do not think it necessary." 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (J. Gales ed., 1789). For an account of the origins of this clause in
the English Bill of Rights and its misunderstanding by the American framers, see Anthony
F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and UnusualPunishments Inflicted: The OriginalMeaning,57 CAL. L.
Rv. 839 (1969).
39 M.AcotLM, supranote 1, at 147-48.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 149.

42 Id. at 158-59.
43 Id. at 139.
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1770, a Georgia law required "for the better security of the inhabitants" that every adult, white male "carry firearms to places of public
worship." 44
On the other hand, colonial authorities made continued efforts
to disarm Indians, slaves, and even free blacks: "Their inability to legally own weapons merely confirmed their status as outsiders and inferiors." 45 Against this background, the stirring egalitarian rhetoric of
the Revolution seems to have fostered a keen sense of the right to
bear arms as a mark of full citizenship. Thus, early constitutional
commentators, such as Joseph Story and St. George Tucker, were eager to tout the republican equality of America by contrasting the full
guarantee of the Second Amendment with what they conceived
(wrongly, it seems) as the more restrictive rights to gun ownership in
aristocratic and monarchical England. 4 6
Professor Malcolm offers a number of contemporary sources indicating that the actual language of the Second Amendment as finally
adopted, presumed that "the militia" would be composed of nearly all
adult, white males-and equally presumed that citizens would have
private arms for their own purposes. For example, William Rawle,
whom Washington sought to make the first attorney general, insisted
that nothing in the Constitution could give Congress "a power to disarm the people," but should either Congress or a state legislature undertake such a venture, "this amendment may be appealed to as a
restraint on both."47
But the strength of this book does not derive from the one chapter in which Professor Malcolm offers a relatively brief overview of the
immediate origins of the Second Amendment. The power of this volume comes from its demonstration of the deeper roots of the amend44

Id.

45 Id. at 141. For more on the relationship between arms and race in colonial America

see RobertJ. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afo-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. LJ. 309, 323-27 (1991).
46 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLAcItsToNE's COMMENTARIES [American annotation] 300
(1803) ("This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty ...The right of selfdefence is the first law of nature ....In England, the people have been disarmed generally
under the specious pretext of preserving the game: a never fMiling lure to bring over the
landed aristocracy to support any measure.... ."); 3 JOsEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1891 (1933) ("A similar provision in favour of protestants (for to them it is confined) is to be found in the bill of rights of 1688 [sic].... But
under various pretences the effect of this provision has been greatly narrowed; and it is at
present in England more nominal than real, as a defensive privilige."); WILLIAM RAWLE, A
VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMIcA 125-26 (2d ed. 1829) ("In
England, a country which boasts so much of its freedom, the right was secured to protestant subjects only, on the revolution of 1688.... An arbitrary code for the preservation of
game in that country has long disgraced them.").
47 MALCoLM, supra note 1, at 164.
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ment. The history of the English Bill of Rights illuminates the
thinking behind the Second Amendment, because the America of
1790 was still very much the child of English history and experience.
In this area, at least, the conditions of colonial life had only sharpened
the inherited lessons of 1689.
Professor Malcolm ends her study with the sensible caution of a
professional historian: "We are not forced into lockstep with our forefathers. But we owe them our considered attention before we disregard a right they felt it imperative to bestow upon us." 48 While her

book limits itself to describing the past, in some ways the most intriguing aspect of the book is its surprising relevance to contemporary conditions. The Whigs of 1689 seem not to have lived in such a distant
world, after all.
First, our situation, more than that of almost any other modem
western state, resembles that of Stuart England in terms of the wide
distribution of firearms. There are over 200 million guns in private
hands in contemporary America and guns can be found in more than
half of all American households. 49 Guns associated with hunting turn
out to be disproportionately in the hands of rural protestants50-in
the continuation of a social tradition that would not have surprised
either the Yankee pioneers of the eighteenth century nor their own
forebears in seventeenth century England. A quarter of American
households, however, have handguns for self-defense and there is no
very clear ethnic or sociological pattern here. 51 Such extensive resort
to handguns for self-defense might well have surprised Victorian optimists but probably would not at all have surprised Americans or Englishmen of earlier times. Professor Malcolm devotes much attention
to the problem faced by Charles II at the restoration of the monarchy
when a large part of Britain was still in arms from the preceeding civil
war. Both Charles II and James II struggled to find safe ways of disarming a potentially hostile populace and never succeeded to any
great extent.5 2 Their problem had special political and religious complications with no ready parallel for contemporary governments in the
United States. But the underlying problem, given the scale of existing
weapons stocks in private hands, seems strikingly similar and is likely
to prove equally intractable for the foreseeable future.
In the second place, the vast scale of crime and disorder in conId. at 177.
49 GARY KLEcK, PoNTr BLANi, GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMaIucA 47, 55 (1991).
48

50 Id. at 38-41.
51 Survey evidence suggests that ownership of handguns does seem to be associated
with lack of confidence in the protective capacities of the police. Id. at 32, 47, 55.
52 MALcoLM, supra note 1, at 31-52, 94-112.
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temporary America invites obvious comparisons with earlier times.
The point hardly needs belaboring. Though there are no precise statistics on crime rates through the centuries, it is clear that Englishmen
of the seventeenth century believed that they were at constant risk of
robbery and assault-and contemporary Americans are also quite
fearful. In recent polls, crime control has been listed as a leading
public policy concern by more citizens than any other "issue." Private
citizens spend several times more money (and even employ twice as
many people) for private "security" efforts than is budgeted for all
public police forces in the country put together.53 Clearly, resort to
private gun ownership, particularly in relation to handguns, reflects
this continuing unease about crime.
Many people believe that a reduction in the volume of privately
owned guns would lead to a corresponding reduction in crime. Significant evidence exists, however, showing that removing guns from
crime victims would only compound the crime problem. Burglaries
of occupied houses are far less common in America, for example,
where many homeowners may be armed, than in otherwise comparable countries (like Canada, Britain and the Netherlands) where burglars have little reason to fear that their victims may be armed. 5 4 But
the important point is that a large segment of the American population is firmly persuaded that guns are a necessary measure of self-protection against crime. Even if they are wrong in this belief, the
intensity of their conviction amounts to a severe political problem for
those who want to ban guns-as it was in seventeenth century
England.
And this suggest a third parallel. Just as in seventeenth century
England, efforts to impose measures of disarmament are bound to
seem invidious and arbitrary to a sizable part of the population. At
one time, the focus of gun control measures was to keep firearms away
from blacks in the segregated south.55 But even in liberal New York
City, far more recently, a stringent gun control scheme was administered with striking selectivity. Under a system where ordinary citizens
had almost no chance to secure a gun permit, the city was quick to
grant special dispensations to the rich and famous-including even
some vocal advocates of banning private access to handguns, such as
John Lindsay, Nelson Rockefeller, and A.O. Sulzberger, publisher of
the New York Times. 56 Exceptions from a stringent gun control system
53 DAVID KOPEL, THE SAMuRI,

54 KLEcK, supranote

THE MOUNTIE AND THE CowBoY

49, at 140. See also BRENDEN F.J.

MOUNTING THREAT OF HOME INTRUDERS

55 KOPEL,

FURNISH

380 (1992).

& DWIGHT H. SMALL,

THE

59 (1993).

supra note 53, at 335-36.

56 Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the OriginalMeaning of the Second Amend-
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may be inevitable, but this does not mean they will be politically tolerable (if they become better known) in a country inspired by egalitarian principles.
The arguments of earlier times may seem most remote in their
insistence that private gun ownership is a necessary check on government oppression. Certainly, the "imagination recoils" at the thought
of armed struggle by American citizens against their own government
at the end of the twentieth century or decades into the next century.
But even on this point, the wisdom of the past should not be dismissed
too quickly. The truth is that Parliament triumphed in the English
Civil War not with citizen militias but with a drilled "new model army"
of professional soldiers. James II was not induced to abandon his
throne by citizen militias but by a professional army under William of
Orange. Even the American colonists could not have secured their
decisive victory over the British at Yorktown without extensive assistance from the professional army and the sizable navy of France. Enthusiasm for armed citizens was not, even in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, based on the notion that such citizens could defeat professional armies on their own. The serious argument was always that armed citizens could raise the cost of tyrannical abuseenough, at least, to give second thought to would-be tyrants.
Clearly, armed citizens continue to give pause to far better armed
governments even in the age of nuclear weapons and intercontinental
missiles. The most advanced and powerful arsenal in the world was
insufficient to provide the United States government with confidence
to keep its troops in the field against armed civilians in Somalia. Britain was forced to the negotiating table with terrorists inNorthern Ireland and the government of Israel felt obliged to enter negotiations
with the terrorist P.L.O., not because these government could not win
an all out war against armed civilians but because they did not wish to
57
continue paying the costs of containing their violence.
Is it unthinkable that these facts might have relevance to American circumstances? One hopes so. But as the deadly assault on the
Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas illustrates, even American governments can be tragically reckless in resorting to force when
the costs are not carefully calculated. Earlier generations would have
taken it for granted that giving government officials more reason to
take caution is not a bad thing. It is hard to prove that this reasoning
has become entirely anachronistic.
One of the curious developments in the most recent debates
ment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 208 n.17 (1983).
57 Id. at 270-71. See also, Levinson, supranote 6, at 657.
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about the Second Amendment has been the concern of some commentators to determine whether a "right to bear arms" is consistent
with a "civic republican tradition" of communitarian values. Professor
Sanford Levinson suggested that the right of gun ownership might
indeed be a logical corollary of "civic republican tradition." 58 The
point was heatedly denied by a feminist critic who was assigned to escort Professor Levinson's ruminations in the Yale Law Journal.59 A subsequent writer equally insisted that a true understanding of
republican principles would lead to the conclusion that private gun
ownership must be entirely suppressed. He argued that the republican principles of the American founders would be better served by
redistributing property, extending popular participation in government and requiring young people to perform public service in aid of
60
the community.
Professor Malcolm's study performs a useful service in reminding
us that the right to bear arms was originally a right of subjects contending with the harsh necessities in a world they could not refashion at
will. It is useful to recall these origins before the debate on guns becomes entirely absorbed in speculations of what is required, in ideological terms, by a supposed "republican tradition" of the American
founding. The founders themselves, while proclaiming a novus ordo
seclorum, took pains to recall the legal landmarks of earlier times. Current debates on gun control might do well to follow their example.

58 Levinson, supra note 6, at 650. The fashion for interpreting the American Founding
in the light of a supposed tradition of "civic republicanism"-supposedly at odds with a
more individualist and acquisitive "Lockean tradition"-is displayed in the symposium on
The Republican Civic Tradition,97 YALE LJ. 8 (1988). For a useful corrective by a trained

intellectual historian see ISAAC KRAMNica, REPUBLICANISM AND BOURGEOIS

RADICALISM,

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND AND AMERICA ch. 6 (1990).
59 Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, PhiladelphiaMayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford

Levinson's The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE LJ. 661 (1989).
60 David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 551 (1991).
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LETHAL

The thesis of Lethal Laws is that, as a practical matter, governments cannot commit genocide except on effectively disarmed populations. However one appraises the success of the book in developing
this theme, one must concede the book's contribution to our knowledge of foreign firearms regulation, which is among the most frequently mentioned, and muddled aspects of our own gun control
debate. Pulled together for the first time are lengthy English translations of historical firearm laws from Germany, the USSR, the People's
Republic of China, Ottoman Turkey, Guatemala, Uganda and Cambodia-all places in which, during the past 100 years, infamous acts of
genocide were perpetrated by agents of the state. There are also facing-page originals of these statutes in their own language. The laws
are set in their historical context by brief but illuminating commentaries which often include information on enforcement practices. This
commentary, as far as it goes, is balanced.' Far from overdramatizing
the scale of various genocides, Lethal Laws inclines to settle on the
lowest reasonable number of victims. 2 Despite the authors' expressly
* Attorney and criminologist, Novato, CA and Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, respectively. Thanks for helpful comments to: Professor Robert Cottrol, Rutgers University Law; Professor Ted Robert Gurr, University of Maryland - Political Science; Professor Barbara Harff, U.S. Naval Academy (Annapolis) - Political Science; Dr. C. Kates, FAC.S.,
Novato, CA, Ms. Marilyn King, Novato, CA, RudolfJ. Rummel, University of Hawaii - Political Science. The authors are sole proprietors of remaining errors.
1 For instance, Lethal Laws notes that among the targets of the Cambodian genocide
are "all Khmer Muslims (Chads)." JAY SIMION ET AL., LrAL LAWs 314 (1995). Professors
Harff and Gurr note that this genocide has been little recognized because it amounted to
only about 200,000 deaths (about one-half of the whole Chad people) out of a Cambodian
body count that may be as much as 15 times greater. Barbara Harff & Ted Robert Gurr,
Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases
Since 1945, 32 INrr'L STUD. Q. 359, 366 (1988).
2 Compare LEAL LAws, supra note 1, at 315, ("It seems safe to conclude that Pol Pot

murdered about one million Cambodians, some 14% of the population."), to Professor
Leiser's estimate of "some two to three million" Cambodian deaths. Burton M. Leiser,
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Jewish connection, they bend over backwards to avoid demonizing the
German people for the Holocaust (blaming the rise of Nazism exclusively on adverse world and local economic conditions and on the
post-World War I Versailles Treaty, which they appear to consider
harsh and unfair to Germany).
Lethal Laws is the second book from Jews for the Preservation of
Firearms Ownership (JPFO)3 to champion a proposition that is central to the argument against firearms prohibition: that the inclination
of sovereign governments to abuse power, including the infliction of
geno-politicide upon racial, ethnic and other minorities, constitutes a
sound basis for sanctioning an armed population capable of at least
rudimentary self-defense. 4 Granting this thesis implicates an extraordinary roster of political sensitivities and cannot judiciously be
dismissed out of hand in the closing years of a century that has been
the golden age of genocide. Yet it is safe to predict that Lethal Laws
will not become the vehicle through which this important public conversation is carried on. The reason for this state of affairs is not to be
found in the book but in its authors' inexcusable bad manners, portrayed, for example, in their penchant for renting billboards or placing advertisements in magazines that equate President Clinton, or gun
control activists like Sarah Brady, to Hitler. 5 In the best of times this
kind of behavior would contribute nothing useful to public debate. In
the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing and especially in light of the
ensuing press coverage, in which libertarians, firearms hobbyists,
members of the National.Rifle Association, survivalists, skinheads, and
neo-Nazis were all jumbled together as a modem version of the Red
Vctims of Genocide, in DIANE SANK & DAvID I. CAPLAN, To BE A VICTIM: ENCOUNTERS WITH
CRIME ANDJUSTICE 278 (1991). See alsoHarff & Gurr, supranote 2, at 364, (listing the death
toll at 800,000 to 3,000,000).
3 The first book was JAY SIMKIN & AARON ZELMAN, "GUN CONTROL": GATEWAY TO TYR-

ANNY (1992) [hereinafter "GERMAN GUN CONTROL"].
4 See, e.g., David I. Caplin, The Warsaw Ghetto: 10 Handguns Against Tyranny, Am. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1988 (reprinted in NEW DIMENSIONS, special issue 1989); David I. Caplin Weapons
ControlLaws: Gateways to Oppression and Genocide in SANK & CAPLAN, supra note 2. Note that
David I. Caplin, like his wife, Professor Sue Wimmershoff-Caplin, is a member of the NRA
national board of directors. See also WAYNE LAPIERRE, GUNS, CRIME AND FREEDOM 166-70
(1994) (LaPierre is the NRA Executive Director); Raymond Kessler, The Ideology of Gun
Control Q.J. IDEOLOGY 381 (1988); Raymond Kessler, Gun Controland PoliticalPower,5 LAW
& POLICY Q. 381 (1983); Elliott Rothenberg, Jewish History Refutes Gun ControlActivists, AM.
RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1988; John Salter, Civil Rights and Sef-Defense AGAINST THE CURRENT, JulyAug. 1988;J. Neil Schulman, Talk at Temple Beth Shir Shalom inJ. NEIL SCHULMAN, STOPPING
POWER: WHY 70 MILLION AMERICANS OWN GUNS (1994); Stefan Tahmassebi, Gun Control and
Racism, 2 GEO. MASON Cry. RTs. LJ. 67 (1991) (Tahmassebi is an NRA employee).
5 One such advertisement, featuring pictures of Hitler and Mrs. Brady, appears in GERMAN GUN CONTROL, supra note 3, at 133. Another is reported in USA TODAY, Mar. 11,
1994, at A10, depicting Hitler rendering the Nazi salute and bearing the caption: "All in
favor of gun control raise your right hand.".
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Menace, such bombastic comparisons accomplish nothing apart from
gravely undermining the credibility of those who are guilty of them. It
is unfortunate that this confusion exists because the foreign experience with firearms regulation and armed populations has much to
inspire reflection as Americans try to reach some sort of admissible
solution for the problem of crime and violence in our society. And on
its own merits, Lethal Laws makes a worthwhile contribution to that
endeavor.
Arguments about firearms policy often fall back into the fashion
of oracular interpretation, in which statistical entrails are examined
and pronounced to imply (or not to imply) that gun control laws can
lead to lower rates of homicide or suicide or that regional or national
differences in patterns of firearms possession explain differences in
the incidence of violent crime. The large question that tends to get
lost in these minute inquiries is that of the ideal distribution of firearms in a society. Supposing we had a magic spell that allowed us to
have whatever world we would like as regards firearms: what world
would we choose? No firearms at all? Police and soldiers armed but
no one else? Brinks truck drivers also armed? Upon what principles
should we draw the line?
The "no firearms at all" option is too swiftly chosen .by members
of the urban upper-middle and professional classes, for on the one
hand, they-that is, we-seldom encounter problems for which firearms would appear an obvious counter; and on the other hand, as we
read in the newspapers every day, firearms-handguns and assault
rifles especially-have become the vectors of one of the major public
health problems of our time. Why then should we behave any differently toward firearms than toward the variola virus, which, thanks to a
century of unceasing effort, has been extirpated from the earth?
The analogy is seductive but misleading. Without variola there
can be no smallpox, but without firearms there can be plenty of violence. For example, the world before firearms was hardly a pacific
place. 6 It is unrealistic to expect criminals to become less predatory
once their fear of potentially lethal confrontations with firearms is removed. At a minimum, then, it would seem that one should want a
police force with access to firearms and for the same reasons (mutatis
mutandis) a soldiery is similarly armed. At this point, one has what
might be called (with some imprecision) the European paradigm: 7 an
6

Ted Robert Gurr, Development and Decay: TheirImpacton Public Orderin Western Histy,

in HISTORY & CRIME: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNAL JUSTICE POuCY 31 (James A. Incardi &

Charles E. Tampel eds., 1980).
7 James B. Jacobs, Exceptions to a GeneralProhibitionon Handgun Possession:Do They Swallow Up the Rule, 49J.L. & CoNTEmP. PROBS. 5, 19 n.42 (1986).
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armed government and a disarmed population. The question is
whether over the long pull this prototype is inherently more irenic
with respect to social violence than one in which firearms are more
popularly distributed.
Most American gun-phobes clearly prefer the European paradigm for two reasons. First they consider it ludicrous that their own
government might become the origin of a secular danger commensurate with armed resistance.8 Massacres and attrocities have occurred
in American history, along with a civil war that was sanguinary even by
the standards of its time; but literal genocides have been fairly remote
from American history. Second, gun-phobes do not give credence to
the prospect that individual precautions, such as being armed, could
prove to be cost-effective (in the broadest sense), given that any hypothetical, assumed-to-be pathological government would command a
heavily equipped modem army, against which small arms would certainly be helpless.
Such reasons, though they have persuaded many fair-minded
people, are unconvincing when looked at closely. It is self-deluding to
deliberate the European paradigm without also recognizing its liability-repeated dozens of times in living memory-to tip into genocidal
extremity. Genocide is a singular event; as Lethal Laws argues, there
are no obvious demographic or socio-psychological predisposing factors, and no reason to suppose that Americans are immune from the
craziness that has overtaken countries both rich and poor, urbane and
agrarian. Most of the people who were murdered by their own governments in this century would undoubtedly have said, before the
fact, that their becoming the victims of any such wholesale mass-atrocities was a simply unthinkable eventuality.
Neither is it necessarily futile for irregular troops to oppose conventional armed forces. Guerrillas have often held their own against
regular military formations; and even if their record were significantly
weaker than it is, an armed population might possess a sort of general
deterrent utility by complicating the calculations and increasing the
expected costs of any aspiring junta or intended putsch. Of course
this is not to suggest that tyranny inevitably follows from banning civilian firearms possession or that past episodes of genocide would not
have occurred, or for that matter that future episodes will not occur,
were the victim population armed.
The policy question, rightly considered, is whether the benefits of
civilian firearms possession-including their effect in discouraging
overreaching by government-are great enough in comparison with
8 See generallyB. Bruce-Briggs, The GreatAmerican Gun War,45 PUB. INT ERST 37 (1976).
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the costs to justify allowing (or for that matter compelling) the civilian
population to be armed. The answer to this question, though very far
from obvious, is crucially important to the long-term welfare of society. Yet giving it detached consideration has been complicated by the
airy dismissal of the entire issue by our culture's principal agencies of
conventional wisdom. Because low murder rates and restrictive gun
control laws have been consecrated as a chain of cause-and-effect by
every major newspaper in the country (to say nothing of network television, Time and Newsweek, and so on), it should not be surprising that
the foreign experience, especially that in Japan and England, where
murder rates are exceptionally low9 and gun controls strict, 10 should
figure prominently in debate. Such ingenuous analogical reasoning
persists in newspaper accounts despite the availability since 1992 of
David Kopel's prize-winning book, The Samurai, the Mountie and the
Cowboy." Examining the experience of England, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Jamaica, Switzerland andJapan, Kopel's work raises critical doubts of whether the connection between firearms availability
and crime has in fact been uniform enough to allow the standard inference that one leads to the other. Lethal Laws adds further, much
needed historical perspective to a different phase of the same question, namely what the foreign experience implies with respect to the
contingent costs of firearms non-availability.
Public conversation about firearms policy has not only been
vexed by the fascination this subject seems to hold for a number of
evidently unstable characters, but also by the tendency of argument in
a polemical environment sometimes to substitute facility for precision
in setting forth relevant information. Zimring and Hawkins, for example, have made the point that few Israelis own handguns (which they
illustrate with a table indicating that handgun ownership is far less in
Israel than in Austria or Canada), 12 and that Israel and Switzerland
have strict handgun laws and report negligible deaths by handguns.
This line of argument, though, says very little about the availability of
firearms to the general population. Indeed, as Israeli criminologist
Abraham Tennenbaum has written, "the homicide rate in Israel has
always been very low.., much lower than in the United States...
despite the greater availability of guns to law-abiding [Israeli] civil9 1991 DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOcIAL DEVELopMENT, STATISTICAL DrvISION 446 (Japan), 454 (UK-England & Wales) (1991).
10 DAVID KOPEL, THE SAMURAI THE MOUNIE AND THE CowBaOY 45, 78 (1992).
11 THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBoy won the 1992 Comparative Criminology Award of the Division of International Criminology of the American Society of Criminology. KOPEL, supra note 10.
12 FRANLIrN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKrNs, THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL 9
(1986).
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ians."13 Relatively few Israelis own guns because any law-abiding Jew
who needs an Uzi, or a handgun, may borrow it, like a library book,
from an Israeli police armory. In the U.S., far from the state giving
firearms to those in need, fully automatic firearms like the Uzi have
been stringently controlled since the 1930s, and now the purchase of
semi-automatic versions of the Uzi-mere, cosmetic lookalikes of the
14
military weapon-has been banned.
Israelis (including Arabs) who want to own a personal firearm
must obtain a license; but this is available, on demand, to any trained,
responsible adult. Unlike the United States, where carrying a concealed handgun is illegal in most places and circumstances, in Israel, a
permit to possess a firearm is also a permit to carry it, concealed or
unconcealed, on one's person. Indeed, authorities recommend that
people who own guns should carry them, the better to secure them
from thieves or children. As a consequence, any good-sized crowd of
people is sure to contain some number of citizens carrying personal
weapons, usually concealed. 15 American-style massacres, in which
numbers of unarmed victims are shot down before police can arrive,
astound Israelis, 16 who note
what occurred at a [crowded venue in] Jerusalem some weeks before the
California MacDonald's massacre: three terrorists who attempted to
machine-gun the throng managed to kill only one victim before being
shot down by handgun-carrying Israelis. Presented to the press the next
day, the surviving terrorist complained that his group had not realized
that Israeli civilians were armed. The terrorists had planned to machinegun a succession of crowd spots, thinking that they would be able to
escape before the police or army could arrive to deal with them.
Of course one should not impulsively jump to the conclusion that
Israeli firearms policy is applicable in detail to the United States,
where massacres are fairly uncommon events. Our point is rather that
a society that is considering the problem of firearms-whose distribution is, after all, one of the most basic questions of social policycannot afford to surrender to the cataracts of misinformation and,
one regrets to say, even disinformation that this subject seems almost
uniquely to attract.
3 Abraham Tennenbaum, Israel HasA Successful Gun ControlPolicy in CHARLES P. Cozic,
250 (1992).
14 Id. Compare Swiss and Israeli laws and practices cited in Glenn H. Reynolds & Don
B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' Rights: A Thought Experiment, WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming 1995) and Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibitionand the OriginalMeaning of the
Second Amendment 82 MICH. L. REV. 203, 249, n.193 (1983) [hereinafter OriginalMeaning]
to Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994) and the newly enacted (v) and 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (1988).
15 Tennenbaum, supra note 13, at 248.
16 See, e.g., the guest editorial by Israeli criminologist Abraham Tennenbaum, Handguns
Could Help, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 26, 1991.
GUN CONTROL: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
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Last year's dispiriting congressional debate concerning "assault
weapons" furnishes an example. Compared to their proportion of the
firearm stock, "assault weapons" are actually under-utilized in crime;
even Handgun Control, Inc. has conceded that such firearms are
practically never used for criminal purposes.' 7 Counterfactual claims
to the contrary (in which assault weapons were repeatedly referred to
as "the preferred weapons of criminals [or dope dealers, etc.]"),
which were made to bolster the proscription of assault weapons, were
allowed to pass from the publicity desks of activist groups or their congressional adjuvants directly into conventional wisdom without having
to endure so much as a quizzical smirk from the press corps, let alone
the acid bath of skepticism with which they ordinarily greet each new
proposed orthodoxy. The New York Times quoted the author of the
federal assault weapon ban, Senator Dianne Feinstein, as pointing
"out the [Steyr] AUG, for instance as the 'favorite of drive-by shooters
because of its light weight and firepower.'" 18 But California law enforcement officials told Daniel Gifford, a free-lance journalist, that
there were no more than 10,000 of these weapons in the entire country, mostly owned by peace officers, serious collectors and the movie
industry. Subsequent calls to other police agencies across the nation
found no one who had ever heard of an AUG being used in a drive-by
shooting.
The melodrama of crime stories come-to-life has furnished an irresistable lime-light that even people who know better cannot seem to
resist stepping into. Colonel Leonard Supenski of the Baltimore
County Police Department, for example, knew exactly how to market
his appeal for the enactment of an assault weapons ban a few years
ago. He told reporters: 'We're tired of passing out flags to the widows of [Baltimore] officers killed by drug dealers with Uzis." 19 The
FBI, however, reports that only one officer has ever been killed with
an Uzi and that was in Puerto Rico, not Baltimore. Less than 1.5% of
police officers killed in the 1980s were killed with any "assault-type
17 See, e.g., Osha Gray Davidson, There Ought to Be a Law (But Not This Crime Bill); The
Foly ofFocusing on 'Assault Weapons, 'N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 24, 1994, at A17 (written by an antigun advocate); James Jacobs, Assault Rifles Are Bad Targets, NEwSDAY, May 28, 1993, at 58.
Chicago Police state that assault-style weapons accounted for only three out of about 2,500
murders reported in the city between 1992 and 1994. John Kass, Daley Beset By Soaring
Homicide Rate, CHI. TRIB.,Jul. 7, 1994, § 2, at 1.
GARY KLECK, PoINT BLANc GUNS AND VIOLENCE INAMRIcA 73 (1991) quotes an HCI
spokesman admitting that assault weapons "play a small role in overall violent crime." For
a detailed review of the latest studies and statistics nationwide, see Edgar A. Suter, M.D.
"Assault Weapons' Revisited: An Analysis of the AMA Report, 83 MED.J. GA. 281 (1994).
18 Philip Weiss, A HoplophobeAmong the Gunnies, N.Y. TrMEs MAG., Sept. 11, 1994, at 66.
19 Sam Fulwood, III., Membership Angry at NRA for Losing Vote in Gun Ban, LATIMES,
May 25, 1990, at Al.
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weapon." 20 Chicago police department statistics have consistently
shown rifles and shotguns of all kinds (notjust "assault weapons") in21
volved in less than 3% of the city's murders.
The case for banning military-appearing firearms cannot be
made on the basis of their liability to actual criminal misuse. The real
basis for banning them lies elsewhere. Though statutory assault weapons are essentially indistinguishable from sporting rifles in terms of
how they work, their rate of fire, the class of ammunition they use
(and so forth), legislators seem to find something specifically loathsome about a civilian-perhaps one ought to say "mere" civilianwanting a firearm that is even cosmetically similar to the weapons
used by soldiers. Cosmetics lie at the heart of this law. For example,
one statutory criterion of an assault rifle is that the weapon possesses a
bayonet mount. Yet there seems to be no record of bayoneted rifles
ever having been used for crime, at least in this country. Another
differentiating criterion is whether the rifle has a pistol grip. But on
what theory do pistol grips make a rifle more suited to crime? The
concern with bayonet mounts and pistol grips, far from being instrumental, is meant simply to burden the brazenness of people who
would dress their rifles in military panoply. In fact, it is a nearly immaculate example of legislation as a form of pure cultural spite-a
point that has hardly been lost on those who have been subjected to
its strictures.
The important contribution of Lethal Laws is its reminder that the

public sector has been by far a greater source of murder in the past
100 years than the private. Not that it is necessarily easy to compare
the lives lost because of civilian disarmament and those lost because of
the relatively easy availability of firearms, but the raw statistics are admonitory. It is a standard argumentative ploy of gun-phobic legislators to point to the disproportion between lives lost in warfare and

civilians back at home shot down by malice or accident. For example,
"in the last 25 years more American civilians have died by gunfire
murders than were killed in the Vietnam War, the Korean War and
World War I combined." 22 Does it not matter to the policy of a liberal
state that by far the majority of these deaths were self-inflicted, and a
very large proportion involved elderly people?23 Well and good, per20 Letters from J. H. Wilson, Chief, Uniform Crime Reporting Program to Paul H.
Blackman, Research Coordinator of the NRA (June 20 and Sept. 5, 1990).
21 Chicago Police Department Murder Analysis Reports, Detective Division Murder
Analysis (on file with the Chicago Public Library).
22 Taming the Gun Monsterthat is Consuming America, LA TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993 (unsigned
editorial), reprinted in CRIME AND CIUMnrNMS 159 (Paul A- Winters ed., 1995).
23 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES,
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haps one might think, to deprive despairing people of the means of
suicide. But of course firearms bans do not accomplish that; they only
place impediments in the way of a preferred means of suicide, obliging the subject to find alternative, perhaps more terrible means. 24 As
a preferred public policy, that state of affairs must be argued, not assumed or established by stealthy elision or germane if inconvenient
facts-even in a legal system in which suicide has always been disfavored. If one confines one's gaze simply to firearms murders, what
one finds is not "gun owners," but rather a small number of aberrant
individuals, risk-takers whose life histories are filled with violence,
crime, substance abuse, and even serious accidents. 25 On the other
hand, genocide has cost the lives of more innocents this century than
all the soldiers killed on all sides in all the world's wars in the same
period, including not only the two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, and
the Gulf War, but the India-Pakistan Wars, the gruesome Iran-Iraq
War, all the Arab-Israeli wars, the Falkland War, and the Russo-Afghan
fiasco. 26 Likewise, Lethal Laws2 7 calculates the total number killed by
the Nazi murder machine (exclusive of World War II military casualties) at thirteen illion Jews, Gypsies, political opponents, and Polish,
Russian and other innocent civilians over the thirteen years from 1933
to 1945-compared with roughly 13,300 Americans murdered annu28
ally with guns.
Whether the presence of an armed population would genuinely
1982, 27J. TRAuMA 532 (1987).
24 It is a point debated in the literature whether rates of suicide in a given culture are
instrumentality dependent or independent. Many countries, such as Japan and Hungary,
report suicide rates much higher than those in the U.S., even though private possession or
ownership of firearms is essentially forbidden. Some commentators believe that if the preferred means of suicide in a given culture could be somehow interdicted, the substitution
of other means would not be complete and thus the suicide rate would go down. Similar
arguments are commonly made in behalf of gun control as a means of crime control. The
premise is far from securely established in either connection. See generally KLEcx, supra
note 17, at 223-69.
25 Chicago Police Department Murder Analysis Reports give the following percentage
for offenders who had prior police records: 1993: 71.68%; 1992: 72.39%; 1991: 77.15%;
1990: 74.63%; 1989: 74.22%; 1988: 73.59%; 1987: 73.81%; 1986: 72.20%; 1985: 70.44%;
1984: 69.78%; 1983: 69.57%; 1982: 66.47%. See supra, note 21. D. MULviHmL Er AL,
CRIMES OF VIoLENCE: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDrVIDUAL AcTs OF VIOLENCE 532
(1969), shows that 74.7% of murder arrestees over a four year period had priors for violent
crime or burglary. In another one year period, 77.9% of murder arrestees had priors. FBI,
UNrFORM CRiME REPORT-1971, at 38. Over yet another five year period, nationally arrested
murderers had adult criminal records showing an average prior triminal career of at least
six years duration including four major felony arrests. FBI, UNnroim CRiME REPORT-1975
42ff.
26 Harff & Gurr, supra note 1, at 370.
27 SIMKiN & ZELMAN, supra note 3, at 149.
AND GRIMES OF Vio28 U.S. DEPr. OF JusTiCE, ButrEAU OF CRM. STATISTICS, FIREAR
LENCE: SELECTED FINNGS FROM NATIONAL STATISTICAL SERIES 13 (1994).
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ameliorate this sort of evil-which is the principal contention of Lethal
Laws-is fairly debatable. Unfortunately, fair debate is one thing it
almost certainly will not receive, thanks in part to its authors' reputation for personal shrillness. They have nevertheless placed a great
deal of new and thought-provoking material at the disposal of a public
that has distinct need of reflecting upon it. Perhaps such reflection
will occur in a quieter time.

